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Abstract 
This study inserts in the stream of research on the perverse effects that PBRF systems 
can induce in the subjects evaluated. The authors’ opinion is that more often than not, it 
is the doubtful scientific basis of the evaluation criteria that leave room for opportunistic 
behaviors. The work examines the 2004-2010 Italian national research assessment 
(VQR) to verify possible opportunistic behavior by universities in order to limit the 
penalization of their performance (and funding) due to the presence of scientifically 
unproductive professors in faculty. In particular, institutions may have favored “gift 
authorship” practices. The analysis thus focuses on the output of professors who were 
unproductive in the VQR publication window, but became productive (“new 
productives”) in the following five years: a number of universities show a remarkably 
higher than average share of publications by new productives that are in co-authorship 
exclusively with colleagues from the same university. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Governments are clearly aware of the challenges of competitiveness in an 
increasingly global and knowledge-based economy. Given this, many countries have 
developed policies for improving the effectiveness and efficiency of their national 
scientific infrastructure. These have included the introduction of New Public 
Management (NPM) tools in national research institutions, such as systems of 
performance-based research funding (PBRF) (Hicks, 2012; Lewis, 2013; Woelert, 
2015). PBRF systems were first implemented in the late 1980s and early 1990s in 
English-speaking countries, and then spread to western Europe, eastern Europe and 
Asia. By 2016, in the European Union alone, at least nine countries had implemented 
comprehensive PBRF systems (Jonkers & Zacharewicz, 2016), each with its own 
national characteristics. 
The increasing influence and diffusion of these systems respond to a series of aims, 
including: i) guaranteeing and improving legitimacy, accountability and effectiveness of 
public spending in research; ii) increasing awareness of the importance of public 
research in developing competitive knowledge societies (Whitley & Glaser, 2007; 
Geuna & Martin, 2003); iii) improving research performance and concentrating 
resources in the best performing organizations (OECD, 2010; Woelert & McKenzie, 
2018; Jonkers & Zacharewicz, 2016; Abramo, 2017). 
PBRFs are generally based on national research evaluation systems, which are in 
turn becoming increasingly common. These national systems can be differentiated 
according to: i) the choice of units to be evaluated (individuals, departments, entire 
research institutions); ii) the way in which research activities are evaluated (observation 
period, type of output evaluated, indicators used, methodology adopted - quantitative vs 
qualitative forms of evaluations); iii) proportion and types of funding allocation 
associated with PBRF mechanisms. Government funds are generally allocated at an 
aggregate level based on the results of the evaluation process, leaving the task of 
internal allocation to the research institutions. 
PBRF systems can have various effects on the strategic and organizational 
management of the structures under assessment, as well as on the behavior of individual 
researchers (Geuna & Martin, 2003), particularly when institutions deploy incentives at 
the individual level, through monetary rewarding systems, access to resources, career 
advancement, recruitment, etc.. (Moher et al., 2018). 
A central question concerning PBRF systems is how and to what extent system-wide 
incentives can translate into local management practices that influence production 
effectiveness, efficiency, and recruitment and promotion processes (Espeland & Sauder, 
2007; Sauder & Espeland, 2009). Woelert and McKenzie (2018) analyzed the 
deployment of the Australian national PBRF system within the individual research 
institutions. The authors “find that universities overwhelmingly replicate the major 
national PBRF indicators internally. If variation was evident, then [it is] mostly in the 
form of minor modifications to these indicators, not in the choice of indicators per se. 
Analysis of the Australian case thus demonstrates strong vertical alignment between 
national and institutional research governance mechanisms as well as considerable 
convergence in the formal organization and governance of research activities at 
Australian universities.” In Norway, findings are “puzzling” (Aagaard, 2015). In many 
instances, the author finds “a quite tight coupling between system-level incentives and 
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local practices. A large variation across institutions, fields and departments is, however, 
also observed.” 
Some scholars have also considered the important issue of the perverse effects that 
PBRF systems could have on evaluated subjects, in addition to the expected positive 
results. These include generation of perverse incentives, inducing scientific misconduct 
(e.g. multiplication of irrelevant publications, plagiarism, self-plagiarism, scientific 
fraud) (Hazelkorn, 2010; Edwards & Roy, 2017), and discouraging interdisciplinary and 
innovative research, and research diversification (Hicks, 2012; Rafols, Leydesdorff, 
O’Hare, Nightingale, & Stirling, 2012; Wilsdon, 2016, Abramo, D’Angelo & Di Costa, 
2018). PBRF systems also present their own direct and indirect costs, which are often 
underestimated or ignored. 
In 2017, the Journal of Informetrics dedicated a special section to PBRF systems and 
their effects on scientists’ behavior (Volume 11, Number 3). The debate opened with a 
discussion paper by van den Besselaar, Heyman, and Sandström (2017a), who object to 
the results of Butler’s pioneering works (Butler, 2003a; 2003b) on the effects of the 
Australian PBRF system, in which significant funds were distributed to universities, and 
then within them, on the basis of aggregate publication counts, with little attention paid 
to the impact of that output. Butler (2003a; 2003b) found that over the decade examined 
there had been a 25% increase in Australia’s share of publications in the Science 
Citation Index (SCI), but also a significant decline in the average impact of output. On 
the contrary, according to van den Besselaar et al. (2017a), the average impact per 
publication had increased following the introduction of the PBRF. 
The paper by van den Besselaar et al. (2017a) was commented by Butler herself 
(Butler, 2017), and by a number of other experts on performance-based research 
funding systems (Aagaard & Schneider, 2017; Gläser, 2017; Hicks, 2017; Martin, 
2017); van den Besselaar et al. (2017b) then responded. This debate on the Australian 
case opened to much broader consideration of some fundamental methodological issues 
in the study of PBRF systems. 
Prior to the above-mentioned special section of the Journal of Informetrics, 
Schneider, Aagaard and Bloch (2016) studied the effects of the PBRF introduced in 
Norway for the 2006 distribution of university and college funding, extended in 
subsequent years to health care and public research institutions. The performance 
evaluation, which examined publication activity, journal publication profiles, and 
citation impact, used a differentiated point system to discourage researchers from 
speculating in “easy publications”. The ex post analysis showed that: overall publication 
activity increased, impact remained stationary, and activity did not shift to the lowest-
impact journals. 
The authors’ opinion is that more often than not, it is the doubtful scientific basis of 
the evaluation criteria that leaves room for opportunistic behavior by the subjects under 
evaluation. The Australian case, stimulus of the above debate, represents just such an 
instance: if, instead of assessing performance and allocating funding according to 
number of publications, the allocation were according to their total impact, then there 
would have been no incentive to produce low-value papers. In fact the ultimate 
objective of research activity is not to produce papers, but rather scientific advances 
useful to the scientific community and/or practitioners. The case of the Italian research 
assessment, VQR 2004-2010, which will be the subject of this study, also left room for 
opportunistic behaviour, i.e. signing papers without contributing to the research. As we 
will explain in more detail, the performance evaluation criteria penalized institutions if 
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they submitted lesser numbers of products from their individual professors than the 
numbers required for the evaluation. Knowing that the full count of products would be 
evaluated rather than the contributions to these, the institutions could avoid penalization 
by asking their highly productive researchers to allow unproductive ones to “sign” some 
of their publications, even where the latter had not made any contribution to the work. 
The aim of this study is to verify whether there is any evidence that could be traced 
back to possible opportunistic behaviour on the part of Italian universities, so as to limit 
penalization of performance penalties and, therefore, acquisition of funding. 
The next section describes the main features of the VQR 2010-2014, which guided 
allocation of a part of the public funding for Italian universities. Section 3 presents the 
data and analytical methods, Section 4 the results, and Section 5 the conclusions. 
 
 
2. The 2004-2010 VQR Italian research assessment exercise 
 
Until 2009, the core government funding for Italian universities was input oriented: 
funds were distributed in a manner that would equally satisfy the needs of each and all, 
in function of institutional size and disciplines of research. Core funding, known as 
Ordinary Finance Funds (FFO), accounted for 56% of total university income. It was 
only following the first national evaluation exercise (2001-2003 VTR) that a minimal 
share, equivalent to 3.9% of total income, was allocated in function of research and 
teaching assessments. The launch of the second Italian research assessment exercise 
(2004-2010 VQR)1 was preceded by vigorous debate, fueled by heavy cuts in financing 
to research and higher education under a series of governments. On the one hand were 
demands that policy makers take courageous action to implement a true PBRF system, 
capable of attaining improved performance at all levels; in opposition, an insistence on 
complete renunciation of the assessment program, or at least its serious revision. The 
VQR thus began in a period of heightened tensions. The purpose of the exercise was to 
evaluate research activity over the 2004-2010 period as carried out by: 
 state universities; 
 legally-recognized non-state universities; 
 research institutions under the responsibility of the Ministry of Education, 
University and Research (MIUR).2 
The MIUR entrusted implementation of the national exercise to the newly formed 
Agency for the Evaluation of University and Research Systems (ANVUR), which 
opened the evaluation process on 7 November 2011, and terminated it on 16 July 2013 
with the publication of the university performance ranking lists. 
The subjects under evaluation were the institutions, their macro-disciplinary areas 
and departments, but not the individual researchers. The results influence two areas of 
action: i) overall institutional evaluations have guided allocations of the merit-based 
share of FFO (13% in 2013, increasing in subsequent years to the current 20%); 
evaluation of the macro-areas and departments can be used by the universities to guide 
internal allocation of the acquired resources. 
The evaluation of the overall institutions was determined by the weighted sum of a 
                                                          
1 cfr. the Ministerial decree at http://www.anvur.it/wp-
content/uploads/2011/11/vqr_d.m._n._17_del_15_07_2011_firmato.pdf, last accessed 31/10/2018 
2 Other public and private organizations engaged in research could participate in the evaluation by 
request, subject to fees. 
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number of indicators: 50% based on a score for the quality of the research products 
submitted and 50% derived from a composite of six other indicators (10% each for 
capacity to attract resources, mobility of research staff, internationalization and PhD 
programs; 5% each for ability to attract research funds and overall improvement since 
the previous VTR). 
ANVUR appointed 14 evaluation panels (GEVs)3 of national and foreign experts, 
one for each university disciplinary area (UDA) in the national academic system. The 
institutions subject to evaluation were to submit a specific number of products for each 
person on their research staff, in function of academic rank and their period of activity 
over the seven years considered. The demand for submissions from university faculty 
members was up to three products, while for research institutions the maximum was six 
products per person. ANVUR defined the acceptable products as: a) journal articles; b) 
books, book chapters and conference proceedings; c) critical reviews, commentaries, 
book translations; d) patents; e) prototypes, project plans, software, databases, 
exhibitions, works of art, compositions, and thematic papers. 
Any results produced in collaboration with professors in the same institution could 
only be presented once. Professors were therefore typically asked to identify a set of 
products larger than the minimal demand, from which the administration could 
complete the selection of the numbers required for the VQR evaluation. The products 
were then submitted to the appropriate GEVs based on the professor’s identification of 
the field for each product. The GEVs were to judge the merit of each product as one of 
four values: 
A = Excellent (score 1), if the product places in the top 20% on “a scale of values 
shared by the international community”; 
B = Good (score 0.8), if the product places in the 60%-80% range; 
C = Acceptable (score 0.5), if the product is in the 50%-60% range; 
D = Limited (score 0), if the product is in the bottom 50%. 
The institutions are also subject to potential penalties: 
i. in proven cases of plagiarism or fraud (score -2); 
ii. for product types not admitted by the GEV, or lack of relevant documentation, 
or produced outside the 2004-2010 period (score -1); 
iii. for failure to submit the requested number of products (-0.5 for each missing 
product). 
This last penalty considered the nature of the Italian higher education system, which 
unlike the systems of English-language countries does not provide for both “teaching-
only” and research universities. In keeping with the Humboldtian university model, 
emphasizing the unity of teaching and research, Italy does not have “teaching-only” 
universities, and all professors are required to carry out both teaching and research. 
It should be noted that both the 2004-2010 and subsequent 2011-2014 VQR have 
received various criticisms concerning the evaluation criteria, performance indicators, 
distortions in rankings and the resulting allocation of resources (Abramo & D’Angelo, 
2017, 2016, 2015, 2013, 2011; Abramo, D’Angelo & Di Costa, 2014; Baccini, 2016; 
Baccini & De Nicolao, 2016; Franceschini & Maisano, 2017). In this work we explore 
the possibility that a failure in the evaluation criteria, in addition to inducing distortions 
in the performance scores and ranks of the institutions, also induces their opportunistic 
behavior. Leaving room for such behavior does not necessarily imply that it occurs: the 
                                                          
3 Acronym of “Groups of Evaluation Experts” 
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extent of the phenomenon very much depends on the cultural traits and core values of 
the specific system. It suffices to say that Italy shows poor work ethic in the public 
sector and universities in particular. Academic recruitment and career advancement 
through centrally regulated competitions have repeatedly come under heavy fire and the 
term “concorso” has gained currency as a word denoting rigged competition, involving 
favoritism, nepotism and other unfair selection practices (Gerosa, 2001; Abramo, 
D’Angelo, & Rosati, 2014; Abramo, D’Angelo, & Rosati, 2015). 
 
 
3. Data and method 
 
This work aims to verify the presence of any adaptation strategies by Italian 
universities, adopted for purposes of avoiding the penalties associated with point iii. of 
the previous section. The 2004-2010 VQR provided for the submission of three research 
products per professor: their evaluation was independent of the number of co-authors 
and the position of the submitting author in the byline.4 Assuming that the criterion 
remains unchanged in successive VQR exercises, it can be expected that research 
institutions, to maximize the performance score, will try to induce unproductive 
professors to produce research outputs. This could occur through serious research work, 
or simply by “signing” some papers (to which they have not contributed) of more 
productive and complicit colleagues (who would still have other works to submit to 
VQR). 
The verification that such behaviour could have occurred is conducted by a three-
step methodology: 
1) We identify the professors on staff in Italian universities in the period 2004-2016 
and census their scientific production indexed in the Web of Science (WoS); 
2) We identify the subset of professors who were unproductive over the period 
observed in VQR (2004 to 2010); 
3) Assuming that that any adaptation strategies with a view to the subsequent VQR 
have been undertaken after communication of the 2004-2010 evaluation criteria 
(which were published in November 2011), we analyze the output of this subset 
of professors over the 2012-2016 period, tagging any output observed as “new 
production”. 
The publication of a given professor is further tagged as: 
 “intramural”, if resulting from collaborations with authors belonging to his/her 
university; 
 “domestic extramural”, if resulting from collaborations with authors belonging to 
other domestic organizations; 
 “international”, if resulting from collaborations with authors belonging to foreign 
organizations. 
The verification of the hypothesis is entrusted to analysis of the publication bylines 
of new productive professors, “new productives”, and comparison with the data 
collected on the rest of the population: if the share of products made only with 
intramural co-authors (or with internal and external authors) is significantly higher than 
                                                          
4 On the importance of accounting for the order of authors in the byline, when assessing institutional 
research performance, see Abramo, D’Angelo and Rosati (2013). 
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the average of the entire reference population, it can be assumed that there has been the 
recourse to adaptation strategies on the part of the universities. 
The source for data on the faculty at each university is the database maintained by 
the Ministry of Education, Universities and Research (MIUR),5 which indexes the full 
name, academic rank, research field and institutional affiliation of all professors in 
Italian universities, at the close of each year. Observed at 31/12/2016, there were 31,381 
full, associate and assistant professors working at Italian universities and permanently 
on staff over the 2004-2016 period. Each is classified in one and only one research field 
named “scientific disciplinary sector” (SDSs, 370 in all).6 The SDSs are grouped into 
disciplines named “university disciplinary areas” (UDAs, 14 in all). To ensure 
robustness of the bibliometric approach, the dataset is limited to the 20,512 professors 
in the sciences, in which research output is likely to be indexed in WoS. Table 1 shows 
their distribution by academic rank and UDA. 
The scientific production of such professors is extracted from the Observatory of 
Public Research (ORP), a database developed by the authors and derived under license 
from Clarivate Analytics’ WoS-Core Collection. Beginning from the raw data of WoS 
and applying a complex algorithm for disambiguation of the true identity of the authors 
and reconciliation of their institutional affiliations, each publication is attributed to the 
university professor that produced it, with a harmonic average of precision and recall 
(F-measure) equal to 97% (for details see D’Angelo, Giuffrida, & Abramo, 2011). 
 
Table 1: Dataset of the analysis, by UDA 
UDA SDS 
Professors 
Assistant Associate Full Total 
Mathematics and computer science 10 376 766 803 1,945 
Physics 8 200 634 476 1,310 
Chemistry 12 377 828 566 1,771 
Earth sciences 12 140 292 193 625 
Biology 19 750 1,087 933 2,770 
Medicine 50 1,939 2,005 1,746 5,690 
Agricultural and veterinary sciences 30 403 814 704 1,921 
Civil engineering 9 119 381 379 879 
Industrial and information engineering 42 362 1,243 1,438 3,043 
Psychology 8 87 207 264 558 
Total 200 4,753 8,257 7,502 20,512 
 
 
4. Results and analysis 
 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the unproductive professors 
(“unproductives”) by academic rank in the first and second periods.7 The percentage of 
unproductives in the second period, at 5.5% of total, is slightly lower than the 
corresponding value (5.9%) for the first period. Both of these percentages decrease with 
increasing academic rank, and for all ranks the percentage of unproductives drops with 
time: among assistant professors from 13.7% to 12.7%; among associates from 4.8% to 
4.5%; among full professors from 2.2% to 2.0%. The balance between new productives 
and new unproductives is positive in favor of the first for all academic ranks, although 
                                                          
5 http://cercauniversita.cineca.it/php5/docenti/cerca.php, last accessed 31/10/2018 
6 The complete list is accessible at attiministeriali.miur.it/userfiles/115.htm, last accessed 31/10/2018. 
7 Note that the first period is seven years, compared to the second of five years. 
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this is marginal: the maximum difference is for assistant professors (7.2% vs 6.2%). The 
always unproductives, i.e. professors who have no publications over both periods, are 
2.6% of the total, with a maximum (6.5%) for assistant professors and a minimum for 
full professors (0.7%). 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the professors in the different classes, per academic rank 
Academic rank 
Assistant 
professors 
Associate 
professors 
Full 
professors 
Total 
Observed 4,753 8,257 7,502 20,512 
Unproductives 2004-2010 13.7% 4.8% 2.2% 5.9% 
Unproductives 2012-2016 12.7% 4.5% 2.0% 5.5% 
Always unproductives 6.5% 2.0% 0.7% 2.6% 
New productives 7.2% 2.8% 1.4% 3.3% 
New unproductives 6.2% 2.4% 1.3% 2.9% 
 
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics for unproductive professors per UDA in the 
two periods. Initially their presence varies from a minimum of 0.7% in UDA 3 
(Chemistry) to a maximum of 24.6% in UDA 11 (Psychology). There are then 676 
“new productives” in the 2012-2016 period, i.e. authors of at least one publication 
indexed in WoS in the period. The distribution per UDA is again obviously uneven: 
incidence with respect to the unproductives in the first period varies between 25.0% 
(UDA 2-Physics) and 66.7% (UDA 7-Agricultural and veterinary science). The 
heterogeneity at UDA level is a reflection of that at the lower level SDS aggregation. In 
the Mathematics UDA, the share of “new productives” relative to first period 
unproductives is 38.2%; the statistic varies from a minimum of 0 in the MAT/09 SDS 
(Operations research) to a maximum of 66.7% in MAT/08 (Numerical analysis). In 
Civil engineering (UDA 8), incidence of new productives ranges from a minimum 
(33.3%) in ICAR/01 (Hydraulics) to a maximum (85.7%) in ICAR/04 (Road, railway 
and airport construction). In Psychology (UDA 11), the overall incidence of new 
productives is again high (64.2%) and varies between 47.6% in M-PSI/01 (General 
psychology) and 87.5% in M-PSI/05 (Social psychology). In the seven other UDAs, 
variation between scientific fields is maximum, since in the second period there is the 
simultaneous presence of at least one SDS still without new productives, and at least 
one where all unproductives have become new productives. 
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of the first period unproductives versus new productives in the second 
period; min-max of new productives in the SDSs of each UDA 
UDA* SDSs Obs 
Unproductives in 
the first period 
New productives Min Max 
1 10 1,945 144 (7.4%) 55 (38.2%) 0.0% (MAT/09) 66.7% (MAT/08) 
2 8 1,310 16 (1.2%) 4 (25.0%) 0.0% (various) 100.0% (FIS/04) 
3 12 1,771 13 (0.7%) 8 (61.5%) 0.0% (CHIM/08) 100.0% (various) 
4 12 625 34 (5.4%) 21 (61.8%) 0.0% (GEO/06) 100.0% (various) 
5 19 2,770 58 (2.1%) 37 (63.8%) 0.0% (various) 100.0% (various) 
6 50 5,690 404 (7.1%) 213 (52.7%) 0.0% (various) 100.0% (various) 
7 30 1,921 180 (9.4%) 120 (66.7%) 0.0% (various) 100.0% (various) 
8 9 879 95 (10.8%) 58 (61.1%) 33.3% (ICAR/01) 85.7% (ICAR/04) 
9 42 3,043 127 (4.2%) 72 (56.7%) 0.0% (various) 100.0% (various) 
11 8 558 137 (24.6%) 88 (64.2%) 47.6% (M-PSI/01) 87.5% (M-PSI/05) 
Total 200 20,512 1,208 (5.9%) 676 (56.0%) 0.0% (various) 100.0% (various) 
First period: 2004-2010; Second period: 2012-2016 
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* 1 - Mathematics and computer science, 2 - Physics, 3 - Chemistry, 4 - Earth sciences, 5 - Biology, 6 - 
Medicine, 7 - Agricultural and veterinary sciences, 8 - Civil engineering, 9 - Industrial and 
information engineering, 11 - Psychology 
 
The next step is the verification for evidence of a possible adaptive strategy on the 
part of the universities, which could have induced/facilitated a process of “conversion” 
for their first period unproductives. For this, we carry out a comparative analysis of the 
bylines of publications by new productives in the second period, against those of a 
control sample of “always productive” professors. 
As mentioned, the VQR criteria provided for penalization of universities if they 
submit a number of products for evaluation per individual professor which is below that 
required. Since the products presented are evaluated independently of the author’s 
contribution (full counting), the institutions could have favored intramural “guest” 
authorship, asking highly productive professors to include the names of unproductive 
ones in the bylines of some of their publications, even if the latter had contributed 
nothing to the work. The hypothesis could be verified if the share of publications by 
new productives in collaboration with coauthors from their own organization is 
observed to be significantly higher than that recorded for the reference population. This 
is what appears to emerge from the Table 4 data. 
 
Table 4: Analysis of the bylines of publications authored by new productives and a control sample of 
always productives; average values and t-test statistics. 
 
New productives Control sample   
Observations 676 990   
Authorships 2,783 13,738   
 
Mean 95% conf. interv. Mean 95% conf. interv. t 
Publications per professor 4.1 [3.8 - 4.4] 13.9 [12.8 - 14.9] 15.07 *** 
International (%) 15.3 [29.9 - 31.4] 30.6 [29.9 - 31.4] 16.56 *** 
Extramural (%) 58.0 [56.1 - 59.8] 57.8 [57.0 – 58.6] -0.14  
Intramural (%) 80.3 [78.8 - 81.8] 78.0 [77.3 - 78.7] -2.67 *** 
Exclusively intramural (%) 32.8 [31.1 - 34.6] 25.7 [25.0 - 26.4] -70.7 *** 
Single author (%) 2.6 [2.0 - 3.1] 1.5 [1.3 - 1.7] -4.15 *** 
No. of co-authors 6.3 [5.7 - 6.9] 8.3 [7.7 - 8.9] 2.87 *** 
No. of co-authors, 
excluding mega-authorships† 
5.9 [5.7 - 6.0] 6.6 [6.5 - 6.7] 6.32 *** 
† publications with 100 co-authors or more 
* p <0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p <0 .01 
 
As expected, the individual output of new productives (4.1 publications per 
professor) is significantly lower than that of the “always productives” (13.9). Turning to 
data on their collaborative publications, we observe that the share of publications 
produced with foreign colleagues is, for new productives, half of that recorded for the 
always productives: 15.3% vs 30.6%. The share of publications resulting specifically 
from extramural domestic collaborations is similar for the two sets of professors; the 
difference between averages (58.0% vs 57.8%) is not statistically significant. On the 
contrary, intramural coauthorships are more frequent for new productives, with 
statistically significant difference, at about two percentage points (80.3% vs 78.0%). 
Observing the publications resulting from exclusively intramural collaborations, the 
difference between the two sets grows: 32.8% of the new productives’ publications 
show a byline composed of all and only colleagues from the same university; for 
“always productives” the statistic is seven points less, at 25.7%. Finally, the bylines for 
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new productives’ publications are shorter: on average 6.3 coauthors per publication for 
new productives, compared to 8.3 for always productives; excluding mega-author 
publications, the difference between subpopulations is less (5.9 vs 6.6). 
These results require a series of reflections and hypotheses concerning the 
underlying phenomena. Focusing on the publications in intramural (including some 
extramural) and exclusively intramural coauthorship, the significant differences 
between new productives and always productives would suggest the possibility of an 
opportunistic behavior by universities, for purposes of reducing penalties. However it 
must also be considered that the long-standing unproductives will find it easier to return 
to publishing by establishing collaborations within their home university, for reasons 
related to proximity and organizational culture. It is certainly more difficult to establish 
new collaborations with foreign partners, unless one has a continuing presence in 
consolidated networks (e.g. PhD obtained abroad, participation in supranational projects 
awarded in competition): situations difficult to associate with the status of 
“scientifically unproductive”. The domestic extramural collaborations have similar 
incidences for the two groups compared, so do not seem to be a “discriminating” factor 
for the hypothesis verification. 
The data on average number of co-authors (observed to be less for new productives) 
could be interpreted in two ways: while the presence of a “spurious” author might seem 
more tolerable in a large team, a smaller team could accept such a presence if there were 
strong links between its members, as in the case of colleagues in the same 
group/department. 
Finally, it should be noted that the share of single-author papers is 2.6% of total for 
new productives compared to 1.5% for the always productives, suggesting that there 
indeed professors who have reacted virtuously to the stimuli for improvement 
embedded in the evaluation processes. The phenomenon of “new” single authorship 
could be predominant in scientific fields of a mainly theoretical nature and less so in 
those of an experimental nature, where the need for facilities and instrumentation 
demands cooperative work. In detail, 54 (8% of the total) new productives have at least 
one single-author paper to their credit, compared to 11.9% for the benchmark. Seven of 
these (five in the Mathematics and computer science area) have two single-author 
publications, three have authored 3, and one even 5. 
Having seen that the above examination of the data fails to reject the opportunistic 
behavior hypothesis, we now analyze the incidence of new productives in the 
unproductives of the first period, for each university (Table 5), to identify institutions 
that have been more effective in converting unproductive professors into productive. It 
will also be interesting to measure the share of intramural and exclusively intramural 
works of the new productives per individual university (Table 6), recalling that the 
averages for the always productives are respectively 78.0% and 25.7%. 
Table 5, column 5 shows the ratio between the percentage of new productives and 
percentage of first period unproductives.8 This is a measure of the effectiveness of the 
incentive systems used by the universities to induce publication by their unproductives. 
Only the University of Tuscia is fully effective (100% conversion), followed by Reggio 
Calabria ‘Mediterranean’ (92.9%) and Insubria-Varese (85.7%). In total there are 31 
universities (out of 48 with at least 100 professors in the dataset) with a conversion rate 
                                                          
8 For reasons of significance, the analysis considers only universities with at least 100 professors in the 
dataset.  
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higher than 50%. Only Rome ‘Tre’ does not record any new productives in 2012-2016 
relative to the 1.9% of unproductives in 2004-2010. 
If, on the other hand, we analyze the scientific production of new productives, and in 
particular the percentage of publications produced in collaboration with colleagues from 
the same institution (Table 5, columns 6-8), the University of Udine tops the national 
ranking. Over 2013-2016 its four new productives achieved 31 publications, of which 
29 (93.5% of the total) in intramural co-authorship and 77.4% in exclusively intramural 
co-authorship. The University of Calabria also recorded a 77.4% share of exclusively 
intramural coauthorship publications, followed by Genoa (62.5%), Modena-Reggio 
Emilia (48.4%). These universities represent cases of nearly double to nearly quadruple 
the rate of exclusively intramural coauthorship publications in the sample of always 
productives, observed at 25.7%. Interestingly, there is no geographical characterization 
of the upper or lower part of this ranking. As the funnel plot in Figure 1 shows, although 
the differences between universities are not always statistically significant, eight 
universities are above the 3-SD band.9 
These two analyses therefore confirm that universities have decisively mobilized 
following the outcome of the first VQR in an attempt to encourage the conversion of 
unproductives. Where the percentages of publications in collaboration with new 
productives are significantly higher than the average of those of the always productive, 
the suspicion of possible opportunistic behaviour is legitimate. 
 
  
                                                          
9 The funnel plot is generally used to illustrate how the size of a university affects the variability of the 
plotted indicator. For details see Abramo, D’Angelo and Grilli (2015). 
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Table 5: Percentage of “new productive” publications produced in intramural coauthorship, per 
university  
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Udine 265 4.2 1.5 36.4 31 93.5 77.4 
Calabria 253 5.5 2.4 42.9 31 83.9 77.4 
Genoa 501 7.0 2.2 31.4 32 87.5 62.5 
Modena-Reggio Emilia 333 3.6 1.8 50.0 31 87.1 48.4 
Ancona Polytechnic 250 2.8 1.6 57.1 25 84.0 48.0 
Turin Polytechnic 371 5.1 2.7 52.6 38 84.2 47.4 
Milan Polytechnic 531 6.6 2.8 42.9 91 78.0 46.2 
Basilicata 173 12.1 7.5 61.9 52 73.1 46.2 
Palermo 549 8.0 5.3 65.9 148 94.6 45.9 
Reggio Calabria ‘Mediterranean’ 104 13.5 12.5 92.9 48 91.7 45.8 
Padua 837 3.3 1.9 57.1 50 90.0 44.0 
Gabriele D’ Annunzio 214 7.0 4.2 60.0 19 84.2 42.1 
Salento 180 5.0 2.8 55.6 17 88.2 41.2 
Pisa 653 2.6 1.1 41.2 22 77.3 40.9 
Bologna 1021 3.5 1.6 44.4 73 91.8 39.7 
Turin 660 5.8 3.9 68.4 70 75.7 38.6 
Pavia 415 4.8 2.7 55.0 40 75.0 37.5 
Messina 479 10.0 6.1 60.4 113 81.4 37.2 
Cagliari 387 7.2 4.1 57.1 63 76.2 36.5 
Bari Polytechnic 154 7.8 5.8 75.0 44 90.9 34.1 
Naples ‘Second’  397 7.1 4.3 60.7 56 69.6 33.9 
Verona 184 2.7 2.2 80.0 18 88.9 33.3 
Trento 153 3.9 2.6 66.7 9 55.6 33.3 
Siena 286 5.6 1.7 31.3 12 75.0 33.3 
Naples ‘Federico II’ 1,108 5.6 3.5 62.9 185 85.4 32.4 
dell’Aquila 324 6.2 2.2 35.0 30 83.3 30.0 
Rome ‘La Sapienza’ 1,710 8.8 5.1 58.7 447 86.6 29.3 
Milan Bicocca 249 6.8 4.8 70.6 42 76.2 28.6 
Catholic Sacred Heart 528 7.2 2.7 36.8 50 78.0 28.0 
Florence 712 6.5 3.1 47.8 91 80.2 27.5 
Ferrara 280 4.6 2.9 61.5 41 80.5 26.8 
Insubria-Varese 164 4.3 3.7 85.7 56 60.7 25.0 
Trieste 303 8.9 5.3 59.3 32 53.1 25.0 
Brescia 223 5.4 3.6 66.7 34 64.7 23.5 
Perugia 400 6.0 5.0 83.3 97 81.4 21.6 
Salerno 281 2.5 1.8 71.4 21 47.6 19.0 
Catania 568 7.4 4.2 57.1 76 92.1 15.8 
Milan 863 3.4 1.6 48.3 72 81.9 15.3 
Parma 444 4.3 2.3 52.6 20 60.0 15.0 
Bari 581 5.5 2.4 43.8 43 53.5 14.0 
Rome ‘Tor Vergata’ 633 5.2 2.5 48.5 54 55.6 11.1 
Camerino 130 4.6 3.1 66.7 19 78.9 10.5 
Sassari 238 8.8 5.0 57.1 22 81.8 9.1 
Tuscia 109 7.3 7.3 100.0 32 68.8 3.1 
Piedmont ‘Orientale A. Avogadro’ 119 1.7 0.8 50.0 2 100.0 0.0 
Urbino ‘Carlo Bo’ 122 9.8 2.5 25.0 10 70.0 0.0 
Rome ‘Tre’ 154 1.9 0.0 0.0 n.a. - - 
Total 20,512 5.9 3.3 56.0 2783 80.3 32.8 
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Figure 1: Funnel plot of the share of exclusively intramural publications authored by “new 
productives” in Italian universities (University of Rome ‘La Sapienza’ omitted because off scale) 
 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
This paper examines the 2004-2010 Italian research assessment (VQR), to verify for 
the possible onset of opportunistic behavior on the part of universities, following 
publication of the procedural criteria, to avoid penalization of performance and 
consequent reductions in funding due to unproductive professors. Opportunistic 
behavior is expressed in giving the opportunity to unproductive individuals to sign 
works in which they have not participated. To this end, we have analyzed the output 
produced in the 2012-2016 period by professors who were unproductive through the 
years of the preceding VQR. In particular, a comparative analysis of the bylines of such 
output was carried out with respect to the scientific production of a control sample of 
professors, who were always productive over both observed periods. 
The results obtained from the analysis show first of all that the individual output of 
the “new productives” is on average much lower than that of the “always productives”. 
Moreover, the bylines of the new productives’ publications demonstrate a high 
incidence of intramural co-authorship, while their international authorships are about 
half of the value found for the “always productives”. There are no differences for 
domestic extramural collaborations. 
As expected, a scientist who has not published in 7 years can begin to do so but their 
productivity is likely to be more modest than that of the always productives, especially 
for publications in international collaboration. Moreover, it will be easier for new 
productives to begin scientific activity with the support of colleagues who are 
institutionally closer. Some new productives also show that they can “do it themselves”, 
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as demonstrated by the data on the incidence of single-author papers, on average seen 
higher for new productives than found on the control sample. However, in general, 
some of the findings make it legitimate to suspect opportunistic behaviour on the part of 
universities. In particular, some of them show a share of intra-mural publications by 
new productives significantly above the reference sample. The possibility that some 
very productive professors allowed their works to be signed by unproductive 
colleagues, to avoid penalties to the university, cannot be excluded 
This empirical evidence should be deepened through specific analyses which, given 
the delicacy of the subject, may not be easy to conduct. An immediate important 
observation is that greater caution in formulating the performance evaluation criteria 
(the adoption of fractional counting of products, for example) could certainly avoid 
occurrence of the opportunistic behaviour. 
The theme of the effect of incentives on academic performance represents a 
pragmatic, consequential field of research. The authors intend to continue to deepen the 
subject by shifting the focus to the effects of the evaluation process known as the 
“National Scientific Habilitation” on the intensity of scientific activity, again by Italian 
academics. 
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